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The genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea
States (CBSS) as a historical case study1
Leena-Kaarina Williams
Zusammenfassung
Die Ostseekooperation steht nach der EU-Erweiterung um Polen, Estland,
Lettland und Litauen 2004 heute vor einer Neuorientierung im veränderten
europäischen und internationalen Kontext. In ihren Entstehungsjahren
zwischen 1988 und 1992 war sie durch innovative Konzepte zum “region-
building” geprägt, was sich vor allem in den Ideen der politischen Akteure
um den damaligen schleswig-holsteinischen Ministerpräsidenten Björn
Engholm sowie einer Gruppe nordischer Politiker und Friedensforscher
widerspiegelte. Im Zeichen der Friedenspolitik strebte man die Bildung einer
“postmodern-reformerischen” Region der Netzwerke und informeller
Diskussions- und Kontaktforen an. Von deutschen innen- und somit auch
parteipolitischen Konflikten beeinflusst, haben die damaligen Außenminister
Genscher (D) und Ellmann-Jensen (DK) 1992 den zwischenstaatlich
agierenden Ostseerat (Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS) als
zentrales Ostsee-Gremium eingesetzt, was dem regionalen
Kooperationsspektrum eine neue, eher traditionell und hierarchisch
geprägte Institution hinzufügte. Der Beitrag rekapituliert und analysiert die
Entstehung des Ostseerates im Sinne einer Fallstudie über einen
vielschichtigen und weiterhin durchaus aktuellen “region-building”-Prozess.
Leena-Kaarina Williams gained her doctor’s degree at the Department
for Northern European Studies at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in
2004. She now works as project manager for Investitionsbank
Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel.
Baltic Sea co-operation has come of age. Increasingly in articles and
speeches there is talk of the necessity for a new definition of the political,
economic and cultural co-operation of all Baltic Sea riparian countries that
exist since the end of the 1980s. This has to do with the recent EU
membership of the Baltic States and Poland, which has, according to many
experts, led to an increasing diffusion of decision-making processes within
the large framework of intergovernmental, non-governmental and
sub-regional institutions and networks.2 In the current debate on Baltic Sea
regional politics the term “hybrid region” is frequently being used in order to
describe this multi-level interaction.
In this article it will however be argued that the complexity of decision-
making structures and the diversity of institutions are a result of the
historical development of Baltic Sea co-operation, where originally a
post-modern3 and reform-oriented construction of the region was
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complemented by a more hierarchical and static intergovernmental
paradigm during the “construction period”4 between 1988 and 1992.
Therefore, this first phase of Baltic Sea co-operation can serve as a
manifold region-building paradigm in a more general sense. It was a
historical window of opportunity that opened up for many region-builders
and their ideas on the construction of a region, all having participated for
different reasons with a variety of goals in mind.5 The genesis of the CBSS
as a historical case study that pinpoints the main actors and their ideas
exemplifies the assumption made above and shows how this regional
endeavour was shaped by divergent political interests and conceptions of
how the intended co-operation should be materialised. At the same time
and in addition to a large amount of performative literature on Baltic Sea
regional policies, this article chooses an analytical approach describing
certain developments in the light of their intended political “mission” and
their impact on the shape of the regional political landscape.
When searching for the founding fathers there has been some competition
and confusion as to what is the actual starting point for interaction around
the Baltic Sea. Unquestionably, when regarding the roots of the first Baltic
Sea regional constructions in the time period considered here, the
ideational cradle stands in the federal state of Slesvig-Holstein, where the
then social democratic Prime Minister Björn Engholm launched the idea of a
New Hanse. A supportive network of Scandinavian social democratic
leaders further enhanced the idea, and the group of those promoting within
Northern Europe began to grow rapidly.6 Beyond the political scene there
was, however, also a fair amount of scholars, especially those working in
the area of peace research, in Northern Europe who seized the opportunity
to actively participate in region-building and thereby complement the ideas
and activities coming from Slesvig-Holstein.7
This group of actors was determined to create a post-modern paradigm, in
which the nation-state was gradually to lose importance and new forms of
interaction, based on networking and people-to-people contact, should take
over. It was seen as a region-building experiment, where the actors
obviously had their own interests but were joining forces in order to reach a
synergetic effect.8
As indicated above, I intend to show how this post-modern project was
complemented by a parallel, more traditional intergovernmental
construction. The two liberal then-foreign ministers Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
(DK) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (D) implemented the Council of the Baltic
Sea States in 1992 as a reaction to the plans of Engholm and his social
democratic counterparts in Sweden and Denmark. The aim was to establish
a “round table” of actors from different NGOs, regions and societal groups.
Party politics and inner-German power struggles between the federal state
of Slesvig-Holstein and the Foreign Ministry can therefore be seen as the
principle motors of the paradigmatic change in the construction of the Baltic
Sea region since 1992.
It can be shown through archival data examined at the federal state archive
of Slesvig-Holstein (Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein) that this conflict of
political interests was responsible for these crucial developments.
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Additionally, several interviews with relevant actors of this time period were
conducted.9 The role of the early region-builders has not been explored in
an extensive manner up to this point.10 There are certain publications which
touch upon the issue, but the particular role of Slesvig-Holstein as the key
motor of Baltic Sea co-operation has so far not been an object of broad
research. This is also due to the fact that relevant archival material was
made available to the public first in 2002.
After shortly presenting the methodological tools and theoretical
assumptions applied for this study, the essay will consider the threefold
concept of actors, ideas and institutions as key factors to region-building
developing the argumentative path for the above-mentioned presumptions.
Theoretical background
During the 1990s the so-called New Regionalism was increasingly being
used to explain new regional phenomena which had emerged during the
aftermath of the Cold War.11 Regionalism is hereby regarded as a positive
turn in history, where formerly hostile states decided to co-operate across
rigid borders and where designated “pre-existing” regions simply
(re-)emerged:
Previously the New Regionalism approach found itself in an
uneasy position between normativism and positivism. This
pointed to certain empirical trends identified as
regionalisation, while reading a more positive content in
terms of regionalism into them than perhaps was warranted.
The end of the Cold War was expected to pave the way for a
more horizontal type of world order and these empirical
trends seem to fit this normative position.12
In my study, New Regionalism is understood not as a theory for explaining
the genesis of regions but as a tool for describing certain structural
constituencies of regional settings. This allows a precise differentiation
between types of regional development, where New Regionalism is
primarily being seen as a “bottom-up” development that questions
hierarchies and supports multipolarism. Old Regionalism stands for
classical intergovernmental relations where states and sovereignty play a
crucial role. The following overview characterises the main constituents of
the two regionalisms in an ideal typed dichotomy:
Table: New Regionalism vs. Old Regionalism13
Old Regionalism New Regionalism
Governing: establishing of new
hierarchies between state and local
levels; nation-states are the main actors,
top-down projects
Governance: formulation of visions and
goals; involvement of all sectors that share
the responsibility for the region; bottom-up
projects
Structure: structural planning; formation
of alliances; diplomacy
Process: process is central; consensus and
conflict resolution are the main goals
Closedness: delimitation and membership
are crucial
Openness: no boundaries; cross-border
and multi-sectoral co-operation
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Co-ordination: hierarchical distribution of
resources through governments
Co-operation: voluntary pooling of
resources on an equal basis
Responsibility: suspicion towards
accumulation of power on the regional
level; fixed responsibilities and little
flexibility
Trust: involvement for regional social capital
and civil infrastructure as a confidence-
building measure
Concentration of power: power as a
zero-sum-game; sovereignty of the state;
hierarchy
Decentralisation: diffusion of power
between diverse regional actors;
networking
This depiction of structural components which can, in various forms, be
inherent to different regional settings serves here as a matrix for explaining
the emergence of the two main parallel regional constructions within the
Baltic Sea region.
If, as stated above, regions do not simply emerge but are for example
generated by a bottom-up movement promoted by regional actors, the role
of region-builders should be closely analysed. This is a key focus of the
Norwegian researcher Iver B. Neumann, who, with his “region-building
approach” encourages students of region studies to examine the process
and the ideas and people behind it:
Instead of postulating a given set of interests that actors are
supposed to harbour before their social interaction with other
collectives, the region-building approach investigates
interests where they are formulated, namely in discourse.
Where every region-builder’s goal is to make the region-
building programme as natural as possible, the approach
aims to expose its historically contingent character.14
Regions are hereby seen as constructions, as imagined communities,
whose existence is perpetuated and communicated by individuals and
reproduced within institutional practices. Region-builders define the
differences and common grounds on which their construction is seen to
have a fruitful political outcome. History, cultural similarity or political
necessities are therefore aspects of the region-builders toolkit with which he
constructs the foundation of regional co-operation:
That begs one vital question: Is it possible to construct a
region as it were ex nihilo? The region-building approach
would side with radical constructivists and answer yes.15
The region-building approach proposes a research design as laid out here:
the role of region-builders, their ideas, structural concepts and methods of
communicating how and why the region should be politically utilised as an
area of interaction are the main subjects of this study. The distinction
between regionalisms assists the analysis of these developments.
Actors and ideas
Among the numerous region-builders active in the Baltic Sea sphere, two
“groups” are responsible for having given a special input to the initial
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formation of the regional entity: the politicians from Slesvig-Holstein and the
northern European peace researchers. They co-operated in an exceptional
manner, exchanging ideas and concepts at shared meetings, writing for
common publications or simply corresponding with each other. Early Baltic
Sea region-building was a joint project of the “northern” intellectual and
political elite, where the primary goal was to create something new for the
region even if the political intentions and “marketing-strategies” for this
might have been quite diverse.
In West Germany, Slesvig-Holstein had for a long time been one of the
poorest federal states. Governed by the Christian Democrats for over thirty
years, it was seen to be a traditionalistic very agrarian northern outpost of
the industrial boom-regions in southern and middle Germany. The election
of Björn Engholm as Prime Minister of the federal state in 1988 put an end
to the long reign of the CDU and opened up a window of change. Along with
other innovations Engholm introduced the New Hanse as one of the key
policies for Slesvig-Holstein, which initiated new and brighter perspectives
beyond the tough competition with other German federal states in which
Slesvig-Holstein had been somewhat unsuccessful.16 Engholm’s idea of a
co-operating Mare Balticum aimed at showing his constituency that it had,
in spite of everything, more in common with northern Europeans than with
Bavarians. This was complemented by the fact that he was part of the
so-called “grandson generation” of Willy Brandt with a strong dedication to
Ostpolitik. The slogan “change through rapprochement” (“Wandel durch
Annäherung”), voiced by Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt in the framework of
the Ostpolitik, had shaped Engholm’s political background and was put into
practice by his initiative of the New Hanse, where he suggested, similarly to
the so-called Mitteleuropa-Politik17 launched by eastern European
intellectuals in the 1980s, a cross-border bottom-up movement fostering
enhanced and peaceful relations between East and West.18
In order to implement these ideas Engholm added a think tank, the
so-called Denkfabrik, to his state chancellery, an institution which
represented a completely new element in the German political landscape.19
The Denkfabrik, consisting of renowned German researchers, was
mandated to generate and document new ideas also in respect to the New
Hanse policy, which were then to be implemented. The outcome of various
brainstorming conferences from August 1989 until September 1990,
orchestrated by the Denkfabrik by inviting a variety of prominent actors from
different societal groups, was to enhance significantly political, economic
and especially cultural ties between all the Baltic Sea riparian countries,
focusing on the implementation of Baltic Sea networks, art events and
regional partnerships.20
Parallel to the process of providing the New Hanse policy with solid content
and concrete projects, Engholm travelled frequently in order to find further
allies within the northern European social democratic sphere. Whereas the
Swedes, and here especially Mats Hellström, at that time minister for
agriculture, were clear proponents of the Mare Balticum idea21, the Danes
and Finns had a harder time letting go of specific fears such as the Danish
deep concern over the possibility of German dominance within the region-
building project and the Finnish “Realpolitik” towards the Soviet Union.22 On
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a trip to the GDR in spring 1989, Engholm was even able to convince Erich
Honecker to be part of Ars Baltica, a cultural network which was one of the
earliest components of the New Hanse policy that still exists until this day.23
A planned trip to the Baltic States was not granted by the German foreign
ministry in 1990; however, informal contacts were on the agenda long
before the political destiny of the Baltic States could be fathomed.
The New Hanse policy can be characterised as being guided by a strong
impetus to re-focus the meaning of “domestic affairs” in Slesvig-Holstein. At
the same time, it nevertheless emerged into a kind of foreign policy towards
Eastern Europe which was not compatible to the strategy followed by the
CDU-FDP government in Bonn. A major factor in Engholm’s affinity to the
North was also due to the strong social democratic dominance in
Scandinavia and the identification of northern German SPD politicians with
the “Nordic model”.24 The goal of forming a cross-border network for
Slesvig-Holstein and the whole Baltic Sea region was seen as a port of
entry into rigid systemic borders and to the export of Nordic societal values
such as an open democracy, a strong civil society and a prioritised social
agenda.
The aspect of exceeding borders was not only traditionally part of the
foreign policy of the SPD but also a key feature of Engholm’s conception of
space which challenged the nation-state and was defined by historical,
traditional and geopolitical ideas. This was mirrored by Engholm’s idea of
Baltic Sea co-operation consisting of networks of NGOs, municipalities,
educational institutions, art associations etc.
Using the term New Hanse for this endeavour was often criticised as
ill-chosen, since it not only conjures up memories of a glorious networking
past but also of German dominance in the region. In Engholm’s case the
title was actually chosen, on the one hand, because of his Hanseatic
background, coming from the city of Lübeck, and on the other hand, and
this was his primary motive, because of his attitude towards governing. His
idea of governance implied a culture of positive encounter within society,
where institutions open up towards different groups thereby promoting an
open discourse.25 The New Hanse was not, as frequently proposed, a
hegemonic approach camouflaged by mercantilist historicism but rather a
label or marketing tool with which the Engholm Government tried to
implement this totally new political dimension beyond the local borders into
the self-perception of the citizens of Slesvig-Holstein.
The Baltic Sea region, constructed by the region-builders from Slesvig-
Holstein and perpetuated by the political leaders was based on the talk
about cultural affinity, similar mentalities, common history and compatible
standards of life with northern Europe under the heading of the New Hanse.
However, for Engholm culture was the main binding link as it served as both
a legitimisation and a concrete co-operation project. Culture was therefore
regarded as the key measure for creating a common Baltic Sea identity,
which was a designated goal of the actors from Slesvig-Holstein and a
distinct label for the policy within the Engholm era. After his resignation in
1993, however, a more pragmatic approach to Baltic Sea politics entered
the agenda, preserving the issue as one of the main policy sectors ever
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since.26
The group of peace researchers involved in Baltic Sea region-building
coincided with Engholm’s attempts at creating a new kind of region and
seizing of the window of opportunity opened up by the historical changes
taking place in the early 1990s. The academic participation of researchers
in active region-building was seen as a rather unusual phenomenon. Some
spectators, such as Iver B. Neumann for example, were said to have been
seeing a “conspiracy theory of how the post-modern, Nordic foreign policy
establishment has staged the project of Baltic Sea region-building” behind
it.27 The double role of these researchers was a conscious choice and
interpreted as an intellectual involvement in a political project. But the
participatory role of the researchers was not only a clear statement for
entering new territory, it was also the commitment to post-modern ideas
questioning the role of the nation-state and its sovereignty as the guiding
principle for political order.
For Joenniemi and Wæver, the main protagonists of the academic region-
building scene, the Baltic Sea region was
to be presented […] as networking rather than building
anything very firm and systematic. To be depicted as a way
of taking advantage of initiatives at the local level, and this
without any necessary interference of central, national
authorities. There has to be space for a variety of names,
labels and symbols ranging from the obviously medieval
such as the Hanse, to post-modern notions such as the
Networking North.28
This openness was also adapted to the other central elements of the
regional construction such as membership, identity and security. According
to the researchers, participation in the region-building project was not a
question of demarcation and drawing circles but rather of a dynamic
process including everybody who wants to be active. The emergence of
various networks and organisations was seen as the key asset and
‘trademark’ of the region, not as an uncontrollable distribution of power:
This overlap is probably to be preserved as long as possible.
At least a duality of Nordic-Baltic, council-to-council relations
and an overarching North European (Hansa) co-operation
has to be kept, and to the institutions has to be added the
constant reminder, that they are secondary, the networks are
the region and thereby it is non-exclusive – just link in!29
Baltic Sea identity-formation was regarded as a key goal for the regional
project. However, the special quality of this regional identity should,
according to Wæver and Joenniemi, be hetero- not homogeneity, which
could be generated by addressing cultural diversity rather than trying to
deliberately create and focus on similarities. Security, being the key issue in
the Baltic Sea region throughout the post-war era, should, according to the
researchers, be kept out of the region-building agenda and moved to other
forums such as the CSCE, NATO, or EC. For obvious reasons security
matters had high priority for the Baltic States during that time and the Baltic
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Sea regional efforts were therefore frequently employed as a platform for
certain verbal battles with Russia.30 For the researchers this aspect was
part of the modern agenda that still existed in parts of the region, which, as
region-building progressed, would be superseded by the post-modern ideas
of soft-security and post-nationalism.
The re-organisation of political space in the Baltic Sea region was from the
researchers’ point of view a reform-oriented project; something totally new
was to be created. This new construction evolved around the concepts of
networking, the decline of national sovereignty and alternative attempts at
security policy. Old Regionalism as in intergovernmental, classically
diplomatic relations was not part of the construction:
The type of region one is thinking about is dependent on
conceptions of politics at the close of the 20th century. In
post-modern terms the crucial issue is linking up to the most
important flows and networks. […] Thus, the post-modern
region might really not be about a whole, contiguous area,
but about certain cities, flows and information. The modern
region is more territorial, state based, concerned about
security (as in the case of the Balts) or about power
balancing […].31
In terms of institutions, this also meant that a truly pluralistic concept was to
be favoured, where smaller entities such as northern Germany, northern
Poland or the coastal areas of Russia could participate and where, on “the
new market of meanings”, post-modern and “medieval conceptualisations
as that of the Hansa” could meet.32
Institutions
Institutionalisation in the Baltic Sea region is a very complex issue. During
the early 1990s numerous NGOs, projects, co-operation agreements and
city partnerships emerged.33 This “explosion” of networks and initiatives
soon led to the consequence that political leaders, especially in Slesvig-
Holstein and Sweden, began to think about an institution which could
bundle these activities according to their understanding of the region. The
genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), founded in 1992,
can only be sketched here. Nevertheless, the main determinants and
milestones, and thereby the differences between, on the one hand, the
institutional model of Engholm-Hellström and, on the other hand, the model
that was implemented by Ellemann-Jensen and Genscher, must be briefly
outlined.
The intense social democratic co-operation between Slesvig-Holstein and
Sweden, creating new policies for the Baltic Sea region, also led to a joint
endeavour regarding the institutionalisation process.34 Hellström had
arranged meetings on this issue already in 1990, where the idea of a
co-ordinating body was even dealt with in the Swedish press.35 Within the
Nordic political elite, however, there were at that point too many doubters,
meaning the idea only gained momentum in the summer of 1991 through
Hellströms invitation to intellectuals from around the Baltic Sea to
Stockholm in order to develop the idea of a so-called Baltic Forum. The key
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outcome of this meeting was a basic plan on the core elements of this kind
of an institution.36 The Baltic Forum was to be pragmatic and consensus-
oriented. Practical questions should have priority over the fundamental and
institutional concerns of international politics. Co-operation should be
flexible, open and not prone to rigid hierarchical structures, the main goal
being societal dialogue, not political integration. Therefore the institution
should represent a forum for different societal groups instead of
governments. The main topics for the sessions within the Baltic Forum
should be research and education, communication, technology-transfer,
energy, environmental problems, transport and culture. The governmental
input could be made during a separate and informal Baltic Dinner. After a
test period these two arrangements could be merged into a Baltic Council.
The aim was to create something new in order to develop the Baltic Sea
region into a model region for Europe.
This concept for a Baltic Forum was used by Hellström and Engholm for
propagating the idea within the Nordic and European political sphere.
Engholm’s key message was a “model of open participation” for a Baltic
Forum which, of course, also resulted from his own political goals to have
the federal states participating in the institution. These ideas were
supported by a resolution of the social democratic group within the Danish
Folketing in September 1991.37 Especially during the election campaign in
Sweden in the autumn of 1991 the Nordic social democratic politicians,
including Björn Engholm, presented the idea to the public.38 The publicity
resulting from the election campaign in Sweden and the Maastricht
referendum in Denmark also reached Germany, where Engholm had not
only been elected leader of the social democratic party but was also the
designated candidate to challenge Helmut Kohl in the next national
elections in 1994. The project of creating a Baltic Forum with an open
participation of civil society and parliamentary actors had rapidly become a
public issue clearly associated with the social democrats.
After the election defeat of the social democrats in Sweden in October 1991
it was up to Engholm to take concrete steps. In an internal paper, the actors
within Slesvig-Holstein discussed the constitutional problems that could
arise from an invitation to the Prime Ministers of the Baltic Sea States for a
founding meeting of a Baltic Forum. After all, Engholm was only the Prime
Minister of a federal state.39 In a parallel effort, Engholm sent a letter to the
Prime Ministers in October 1991 to initiate a first preparatory meeting for the
Baltic Forum, which should take place in January 1992,40 and also to the
German then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, informing
him of his plans.
Genscher’s reply to this letter marks the turning point in the founding history
of the CBSS and ensures that Engholm was not to be tolerated as a key
actor on the Baltic Sea stage any longer. Genscher agreed that new
developments in the region had created a necessity for action, but only with
clear roles and “within the sphere of constitutional responsibility.”41 In the
same letter, Genscher informed Engholm that he and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
had invited the ambassadors of the region to Rostock in October 1991,42
where the founding of a Council of the Baltic Sea States was to be decided
upon. To this end the Foreign Ministers of all the Baltic Sea states would be
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invited to the founding conference in March 1992. Genscher wrote that the
founding of the CBSS
is an issue that according to Art. 32(1) GG [= German
Constitution, LKW] falls into the sphere of competence of the
Federal Government of Germany. […] For this reason the
Federal Government will not support your initiative.43
The only concession Genscher made was the offer to invite one
representative of the federal states to the founding conference in
Copenhagen. In relation to Engholm’s activities in Baltic Sea co-operation
the phenomenon of so-called “Nebenaußenpolitik”, i.e. foreign policy
performed by a German federal state, was often cited and is subsequently a
topical issue of the debate on the power division within the German federal
system.
The reason for Genscher’s harsh reaction remains open to speculation.
Engholm, being on the verge of establishing a respected profile as an
international politician was surely not welcomed by the CDU/CSU-FDP
government, knowing that he was going to lead the SPD into the next
national elections. Internal German party political rivalries therefore seem to
have been a crucial factor for the further development of Baltic Sea
politics.44 But also in Denmark, the idea of a Baltic Forum might have
become too much of a social democratic endeavour in the eyes of
Ellemann-Jensen. As party colleagues and good friends, the two Foreign
Ministers simply put their foot down on the issue by using their formal
power.
This sudden coup by the two Foreign Ministers gave the future member
states very little time to plan and act. The CBSS was founded in March
1992 and has since then developed itself in different directions. Not only the
implementation of a permanent secretariat in 1998 but also the constant
adaptation of new thematic fields and the recognition as an international
organisation were significant milestones for the CBSS.45 The initial
architecture of the Council was, however, quite formalistic and clearly
conceived by actors, whose political understanding had been formed
accordingly to the guidelines of Old Regionalism. Annual intergovernmental
conferences of the Foreign Ministers prepared by a Committee of Senior
Officials recruited from the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs were to
be held by rotating presidencies. Special members, such as the European
Commission, and special guests and observers, for example from
sub-regions, were bid welcome and working groups on special issues were
planned. According to the Terms of Reference, sub-regional activities were
to be given high priority, since Baltic Sea regional co-operation was in need
of participation on different levels.46
The main contents for co-operation within the CBSS at that time were first
democratic development, second economical and technical aid, third
humanitarian affairs and health, fourth environmental protection and energy,
fifth culture, education, tourism and information, and sixth transport and
communication. The main difference to the initial ideas proposed by
Slesvig-Holstein and the peace researchers was not only that the activities
had been shifted to the intergovernmental level, but that they had been
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shifted to give a stronger focus on “development aid” for the Baltic States,
and thus formulated in the wording of classical foreign policy.47
Nevertheless, the reactions to this development were predominantly
positive, also in Slesvig-Holstein. The main criticism offered was directed at
the accumulation of institutions within the European framework.48 The
disappointment of Engholm and his supporters was not discussed.
Obviously, the policy here was not to raise the issue in the press, since
Engholm had de facto not completely followed the formal rules and at the
same time wished to keep his image as the founding father of Baltic Sea
co-operation.49 Making Genscher’s decision a public issue would have
been counterproductive to Engholm’s personal political ambitions. In any
case, it had at that point become clear that Slesvig-Holstein had now
formally lost its say within Baltic Sea politics and thereby also the official
channels to voice its ideas.50 This was of course not the case on the
informal level or within various networks, projects and activities, as Slesvig-
Holstein is until today one of the most active proponents of Baltic Sea
regionalism.
However, the paradigmatic change in the key ideas initiated by the actors
from Slesvig-Holstein and the peace research scene was brought about by
this shift in the institutional architecture. The Baltic Sea region moved from
constructions of New Regionalism into a framework complemented by Old
Regionalism. This new development was also closely followed by the
researchers, who in a quick reaction presented a charter that they had
formulated at a conference in summer 1992 at the Nordic Centre for Spatial
Planning (NORDREGIO). Here the will to form a Baltic Sea community
without rigid borders and political goals such as solidarity and the formation
of a common identity was formulated. A “Confederation of Baltic Sea
Regions” should, in accordance with the Engholm-Hellström model, be
open and flexible and the membership voluntary. This proposal was a last
attempt at counteracting the intergovernmentalism of the CBSS.51 Before
the conference, Joenniemi and Wæver addressed a letter to Engholm in
early 1992, inquiring as to what had happened to the initial ideas and how
they should interpret these developments.52
The “post-modern and reform-oriented” region-building project had been
complemented by an “intergovernmental and institutional” paradigm
changing the main co-ordinates of the regional framework.
Summary and outlook
In this study, the genesis of the two main lines in the construction of the
Baltic Sea region was sketched out by addressing key actors, ideas and
institution-building as in case of the CBSS. It was shown that, during the
region-building period between 1988 and 1992, the initial ideas of region-
building, concerning the main political topics and the institutionalisation, had
their roots within different understandings of “region” which can be
characterised as dynamics of Old and New Regionalism.
During the course of time the two constructions have “settled” within the
regional framework. There is a fair amount of interplay between the different
levels of co-operation as in the concept of “hybrid regions” mentioned at the
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beginning of this article. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the post-modern
and reform-oriented construction has been contested by the strong role of
the CBSS, since certain structural complications automatically appeared to
become relevant. The post-modern project had propagated the complexity
and network character of regional interaction, whereas for the
intergovernmental sphere this had been seen to be a challenge: only
through the implementation of the CBSS in its present constitution
questions of membership and certain responsibilities have become relevant.
The post-modern construction that presently coexists within various
networks and projects had postulated the diffusion of power in general and
the decline of power of the nation-state in particular. In this respect, the
post-modern region-building endeavour was to a far extent ill-prepared. The
nation-states obviously did not yet think enough in a post-modern way as to
let go of their traditional role as manifested within the framework of the
CBSS.
One example for this is the German case, where the recent governments in
Berlin quite obviously have shown far less interest in the Baltic Sea region
than the coastal federal states of Slesvig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania. A common institution or round table as suggested by
the post-modern and reform-oriented actors, where regions, NGOs,
parliamentarians and different societal groups could have exchanged
experiences, written common resolutions and informed their governments
about the needs and activities, might have been a more effective forum than
the CBSS with its formalised institutional architecture.53 However, having
stated this, it is quite clear that the CBSS has addressed this problem in
several ways, for example by adapting a working group structure with
thematic experts or initiating the NGO forum.
But not only does the CBSS nowadays also act within a wide variety of
non-governmental activities, the intergovernmental scenery has also
changed dramatically during the last years. The entrance of the Baltic
States into the EU has especially led to questions on the future role of the
CBSS. After the CBSS summit in Laulasmaa, Estonia in June 2004 new
policy ideas about the relevance of the CBSS after the enlargement were
voiced by, for example, German politicians proposing that the CBSS should
re-focus on environmental questions and the integration of Russia into the
larger European framework. And, interestingly enough, the summit
resolution also proposed to reform the CBSS in such a way, that it could
turn into an institution that is as “flexible and informal as possible.”54 In the
light of the post-modern and reform-oriented construction postulated in the
early 1990s this sounds like a familiar concept.
This time travel presented here might consequently be useful in a time
where a new “formative moment” has appeared for the Baltic Sea region
due to the political developments within Europe. The Baltic Sea region has
gone through several evolutionary phases as documented in this study, and
is now in need of adequate strategies for transformation and adaptation of
the institutional landscape and decision-making procedures within the
enlarged EU. This might effectively lead to a re-consideration of some of the
ideas of the early region-builders, where the Baltic Sea regional project with
its institutional design was definitely seen to be more than a “back office” for
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the European Commission or solely a transformation aid institution for
non-EU members. Time will tell.
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